



Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001500020009-3

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.  
JOINT INTELLIGENCE GROUP

Copy No. 1  
4 February 1952

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, CENTRAL  
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Subject: Timing and Nature of Soviet Campaigns  
Against Scandinavia

1. In reply to your memorandum 53920, dated 28 January 1952, informal comments are submitted as follows:

a. Paragraph 1 a. In the event of a general war between the Soviet Union and the Western Allies, it is considered that Soviet action would follow generally along the lines of undertaking:

(1) Simultaneous campaigns and operations against:

- (a) Western Europe
- (b) The British Isles (aerial bombardment and sea and air interdiction of LOC's)
- (c) The Near and Middle East
- (d) The Far East
- (e) Canada and the United States, including Alaska and the Aleutians
- (f) Allied sea communications
- (g) Targets of great importance to the Allies, including areas from which Allied strategic bombers would operate.

(2) Sabotage and subversive activities against Allied interests in all parts of the world concurrently with (1) above.

(3) Defense of the USSR against hostile attack.

(4) As soon as feasible, campaigns and operations against:

- (a) The Scandinavian Peninsula
- (b) Italy (subsequent to gain of control over Northern Yugoslavia)

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Date 2-16-81 Reviewer 009256

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(c) The British Isles (an invasion dependent upon the outcome of (1) (b) above, and after the occupation of Channel port areas and seizure of control over essential sea communications)

(d) The Iberian Peninsula.

Soviet operations against Western Europe would involve nearly simultaneous attacks against Western Germany, Luxembourg, Belgium, the Netherlands, France and Denmark. The main thrust of a Soviet attack on Western Europe would in all probability develop through the North German plain, secure the Channel port areas, and thence proceed down the western coast of France to the Pyrenees. Secondary attacks would probably develop across central and southern Germany and thence through the Lorraine and Belfort Gaps into central and southern France, with a minor thrust into Denmark.

With the capability to mine the Skagerrak and Kattegat and with Sweden remaining neutral, the Soviet Union would probably attack Norway shortly after the occupation of Denmark. The main effort could be an amphibious and airborne operation striking at Oslo from Denmark. A secondary and possibly simultaneous operation involving one division could be mounted from Murmansk to strike the Narvik area from the sea. The main thrust in the south would extend from Oslo along the railroads and highways leading to Trondheim, Bergen, Stavanger, and Kristiansand. The forces landing in the Narvik area would strike south as far as logistical conditions would permit. The entire operation would be supported and protected by air.

b. Paragraph 1 b. The current view is that if Sweden remains neutral, the USSR will not attack that country unless it is found necessary to do so. This view holds both in the event of war in 1952 and 1954.

c. Paragraph 4 a. If the Soviet rulers believe that their object cannot be fully attained without involvement in a general war against the Western Powers, they may decide deliberately to provoke such a war when, in their opinion, the balance of strength of the Soviet Union vis-a-vis the Western Powers is in their favor. It is estimated that such a period exists now and will extend from the present at least through 1954.

d. Paragraph 4 b. See mobilization, and pertinent comments enclosed herewith with respect to Norway and Sweden.

2. It is recognized that the above comments are not as definitive as we would like to furnish, but are believed to be the best available at the present time.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE:



S. M. LANSING  
Colonel, USA  
Executive Officer  
Joint Intelligence Group

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ENCLOSURE "A"

Mobilization Potential (Norway)

1. The speed of mobilization is indicated in the following table:

<u>Time</u>	<u>Strength</u>	<u>Units</u>
M - Day	18,000	1 Mixed Brig; 1 Bn
M / 30 Days	65,000	6 Mixed Brigs
M / 180 Days	120,000	6 Mixed Brigs

Reserves

2. Trained Reserves. There are approximately 90,000 men who can be considered trained reserves. Groups of 3,500 are receiving two months' refresher training.

3. Untrained Reserves. There are approximately 40,000 reserves liable for recall, who must be considered untrained.

Combat Efficiency

4. Army. Except for the Occupation Brigade, the Norwegian Army is not prepared for combat. Its strength lies in its hardy manpower and high morale. Its weaknesses include a lack of permanent personnel (officers, career noncommissioned officers, and technicians), inadequate staff training for officers, short conscript training period, lack of large-scale maneuvers, lack of combat experienced leadership, and absence of operational units except for the brigade in Germany. While the Norwegian Army has been trained in British tactical doctrines and techniques, more and more United States doctrines and techniques are being adopted. Because of the nature of the terrain, the Army has been specially trained in snow and mountain warfare. Guerrilla tactics have been studied and have reached a fairly high degree of development. Infiltration tactics are also fairly well developed.

5. Navy. Although the Norwegian Navy suffers from a lack of properly trained personnel and modern equipment, it is believed to have the capabilities of performing ASW, escort, minelaying and minesweeping missions at an acceptable standard.

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6. Air Force. The Norwegian Air Force is a small defensive arm on the same organizational level as the Army and Navy. Lack of adequate spares, and a poorly organized supply system, have an adverse effect on serviceability. The morale of Air Force personnel is good, and is coupled with a strong determination to resist aggression with all means available. Norway is engaged in a realistic plan for improvement of her air force. This plan calls for an intensive training program of present personnel and an expansion of the jet fighter forces. At present the combat value of the Norwegian Air Force is negligible against a major power because of lack of equipment.

7. Relative Efficiency

a. To Assure Internal Security. Norway with its Army and Home Guard is capable of maintaining internal security.

b. To Defend

(1) Borders. Norway is not capable of defending her northern border but would probably attempt in the event of invasion from the north to abandon all of Finnmark and hold a narrow line at Lyngsfjord until aid could arrive. She is not capable of defending her Swedish border. Allowing a week to mobilize, Norway's forces would be 6 Brigades. Stocks would permit a month's action.

(2) Strategic Areas. Norway could not defend strategic areas in the south for more than a month.

(3) Utilization of Guerrilla Warfare. It is probable that by means of guerrilla warfare, an invader could be harassed and considerably delayed but could not be prevented from occupying the country.

c. To Wage Offensive War. The Norwegians have negligible offensive capability.

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Quasi-Military Organization

8. Norway has a large and growing Home Guard, which is being given extensive part-time training to support the Army in defense of the country. Present strength is about 90,000, and it is planned to increase this total to 120,000. The Home Guard is being armed and trained in many roles, such as antiaircraft, coastal defense, and particularly sabotage and countersabotage. It represents a potential underground and guerrilla force which would present serious difficulties to an invader and would play a major role in the event of internal disturbance.

VULNERABILITY

Economic

9. Since only 3 per cent of the land is arable, one half of the total food requirements must be imported, as must fuel and several minerals.

Social-Political

10. Norway is socially and politically homogeneous and would strongly resist disunifying influences.

Military

11. Norway is open to invasion from the southeast, east and northeast along established routes. Oslo, the most important governmental and industrial center, is the most vulnerable to attack.

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ENCLOSURE "B"

Mobilization Potential (Sweden)

1. Based on World War II tests, mobilization could be effected in 72 hours but several weeks would be required for unit organization and training.

<u>Time</u>	<u>Strength</u>	<u>Units</u>
M - Day	50,000	None
M / 30 Days	600,000	36 RCT's
M / 180 Days	600,000	36 RCT's, combat ready

Reserves

2. Trained. It is estimated that Sweden has a trained reserve of 850,000. During 1951 some 120,000 personnel received one month of refresher training.

3. Untrained. Sweden has had compulsory military training since 1812 for all physically fit males and it may be assumed that the mobilization potential has all been trained to a certain degree.

Combat Efficiency

4. Army. The Swedish soldier is strong, rugged, accustomed to hardship and outdoor life, and individually well-trained. Principal weaknesses are lack of large unit training, lack of high level staff experience and complete lack of combat experienced leaders and men. Tactical doctrines for small units and for winter warfare are well developed. During 1951 a large scale maneuver involving 35,000 men was held.

5. Navy. In terms of available modern ships, the Swedish Navy ranks first among the minor navies of the world. An exceptionally high standard of seamanship, discipline and material maintenance creates a tendency to overrate the Swedish Navy; however, postwar

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Swedish naval exercises have shown that combat conditions of the 1930's are the prevailing standards for doctrine and training. The Swedish fleet has been untested by war for well over a century, consequently, there can be no true assessment of its combat effectiveness.

6. Air Force. The Royal Swedish Air Force is the world's fourth air force in effective strength, and its combat value would be high initially. However, lack of experience in actual combat and failure to appreciate fully capabilities of aircraft are limiting factors. Its mission is defensive. It is significant that almost two-thirds of the total number of aircraft of the Swedish Air Force are in tactical units. The major portion of aircraft are fighters. The Swedes have started production on the J-29, a high performance jet fighter of Swedish design.

7. Relative Efficiency

a. To Assure Internal Security

(1) Against Sabotage. The presence of an organized Home Guard in Sweden and the nationalistic nature of the Swedish people would be the determining factors in the control of sabotage in the event of a national emergency.

(2) Against Riots and Insurrections. The very nature of the stolid, patriotic Swedes and the extremely stable government exclude the danger of riots and civil war.

b. To Defend

(1) Borders. The long coast line and the long Norwegian and Finnish borders are difficult problems in defense. Once the border or coast line of Sweden is penetrated, the country offers little in the nature of natural defense lines to protect the strategically important industrial southern third of Sweden. A brief delaying action is the most that Sweden could perform. Sweden's military forces could be mobilized in an estimated time of one week to a strength of approximately



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12 divisions without effective armor. These divisions could be sustained under combat conditions, on the basis of available supplies, for probably six months. However, since the entire army would need at least a four-to-six months period of unit training after mobilization, a brief delaying action is all that Sweden could perform in the face of an immediate invasion.

(2) Utilization of Guerrilla Warfare. The Swede is rugged and able. This characteristic together with his knowledge of mountain and winter combat should enable Sweden to carry on effective guerrilla warfare.

c. To Wage Offensive War. The present condition of Sweden's armed forces makes it incapable of offensive warfare.

Quasi-Military Organizations

8. Sweden has a Home Guard of roughly 100,000 men. There is sufficient equipment to arm these men for localized defense. Their greatest deficiency is a lack of refresher training.

VULNERABILITYEconomic

9. Sweden is moderately vulnerable to a blockade of its coast line. Normally, it imports all its coal and petroleum, but its possession of a large hydroelectric power capacity and fuel substitutes lessen the importance of this deficiency. The greatest vulnerability of the transportation network results from the necessity for a high proportion of bridging and tunneling, by the dependence of much of the railroad system upon electricity for motive power, and of motor transport upon imported fuel.

Military

10. Sweden's poor conception of the requirements of modern defense and its over-optimism about its ability to withstand a modern invasion are its main strategic military vulnerabilities.

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APR 17 1952

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SOURCE	CIA CONTROL NO.
JCS - JIG	53947
DOC. NO. none	DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED
DOC. DATE 4 February 1952	6 February 1952
COPY NO. 1	LOGGED BY
NUMBER OF PAGES 9t	mlh
NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS	
2	

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